

1948

BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON.

GREEN REG.

File No.:

Y 103/1-25

F0115/4377

WEEDED

Name of File:-

Palestine: Security Council

LAST Year's File No.:

NEXT Year's File No.:

SECRET

Ref. G. 103/ /48

May 27th, 1948

*1 left Henderson, and showed it to Mr. Morrison at
 Henderson's office. It is based on the instructions in
 F.O. Tel. 5728. -/44.*

78 The summary of Mr. Bevin's conversation

1/44 with Mr. Douglas about Palestine on the 25th May which I sent to you in my letter of that date, mentioned that Mr. Bevin had strongly persuaded the Arab Governments to accept without conditions a cease fire on the terms laid down in the Security Council's resolution.

We have this morning received instructions from the Foreign Office to inform you of the latest developments in this connexion, and I accordingly enclose a brief note summarising in particular the action taken yesterday by the British Minister at Amman.

Mr. Bevin is particularly anxious that this information should be in Mr. Lovett's possession at the earliest possible moment.

W D ALLEN

Mr. Loy Henderson,
 Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs,
 Department of State of the United States,
 Washington, D. C.

INDEXED

As the Department of State are aware, British representatives in all of the Arab countries, acting on instructions from the Foreign Office, have in recent days been taking every opportunity to urge strongly and at the highest possible level that the Arab Governments should accept the cease fire for Palestine on the terms proposed by the Security Council and without attaching any conditions to their acceptance. The British representatives have been using all possible arguments in an endeavour to persuade the Arab Governments that they had nothing to lose and, from the point of view of their international position in the world, a very great deal to gain by accepting the cease fire.

The British representatives in all the Arab capitals have had repeated interviews with the Prime Ministers or Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Governments to which they are accredited. In addition, conversations have been held with the King of Egypt, the President of Syria, the Regent of Iraq, the King of Transjordan, and also with Azzam Pasha, the Secretary General of the Arab League.

Many of these conversations have taken place in Amman, where many Arab notables, including the Regent of Iraq, have been gathered in order to discuss the cease fire question. His Majesty's Minister at Amman has been in constant touch with these Arab representatives during the past few days and has lost no opportunity of pressing upon them the arguments of the British Government.

On the 25th May Sir A. Kirkbride had a conversation with the Regent of Iraq. He later learnt that in response to his urgings, the Regent of Iraq had asked the Prime Minister of Transjordan to do all he could to secure

acceptance of the cease fire but not to do it in such a manner as to enable other States to accuse the Hashemites of having abandoned the fight first. In reporting this Sir A. Kirkbride commented that this attitude of mind together with the suspicion of the other Arab States that Transjordan always intended to halt short of Jewish territory in Palestine gave rise to the difficulties encountered in connexion with the cease fire resolution.

Sir A. Kirkbride has reported that on the morning of the 26th May the King of Transjordan telephoned to him and said apologetically that he had done all he could to secure a cease fire but that the opposition of Azzam Pasha and the Egyptian Delegate (despite the very strong representations made by His Majesty's Ambassador to the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and King Farouk in Cairo) had resulted in a resolution of the Political Committee of the League which was neither acceptance nor refusal. Sir A. Kirkbride at once sought to get into touch with the Prime Minister of Transjordan and found him sitting with other delegates producing the final resolution.

An interview was at once sought with the Prime Minister and a final effort was made to urge upon him the importance of accepting the cease fire. At the interview the Prime Minister said that there was no chance of changing the resolution, the substance of which is annexed. He added that it was only after great effort that he had secured ^a so conciliatory message as the opposition had wished to refuse to consider the appeal at all. The relatively mild wording of the resolution was out of courtesy to Great Britain, whose efforts on behalf of the Arabs were genuinely appreciated.

Sir A. Kirkbride said that, while it was with a feeling of personal failure that he reported this position, he was convinced that King Abdullah and the Prime Minister of Transjordan did their best to satisfy the wishes of the British Government.

After a long preamble, the resolution continued as follows:-

In view of the above mentioned reasons, the Arab States, which welcome every step towards the establishment of peace and order, believe that the realisation of the Security Council's wish, which is shared by them, necessitates adherence to the original resolution of the Security Council (of the 16th April) and the adoption of practical and just measures which are indispensable in order that the cease fire should not merely act as a breathing space for a fiercer and more violent conflict later.

Moreover, in order to ensure that the result of the cease fire in fact brings about a just solution and a complete peace in accordance with the wishes of the Security Council, the Political Committee of the Arab League now in session is prepared to study within forty-eight hours any proposition that the Security Council may offer as a basis for the solution of the Palestine problem.

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Palestine: Security Council

Tel. No. 5728

of May 27th

CYPHER RX/OTP

MOST IMMEDIATE

From Mr. Bevin

To Sir John Balfour

G. 103/44/48

d. 12.50 p.m., May 27th, 1948.

r. 8.05 a.m., May 27th, 1948.

Copy to:

Mr. Bromley
Brigadier Price

SECRET.

I presume that you are keeping State Department fully informed of developments over Palestine as reported in telegrams from Middle East posts and particularly from Amman, where United States Government have no representative. In particular please make sure that Lovett is in possession this morning of substance of paragraphs 1 to 4 and 6 of Amman telegram No. 399. I leave it to your discretion whether to communicate paragraph 5.

*Yes. Mr. Allen prepared
a piece for Mr. Lovett & look it
to the S.D. in the morning.*

*W. Bromley
28/5*

7623:ds

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Tel. No. 5700

of 26th May, 1948.

CYPHER RX/OTP

MOST IMMEDIATE

Copy to: Mr. Bromley

Brig. Price

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7591:jo

1376/67/48

1 Mr. Bromley
28/5/48

Palestine: Security Council

From Mr. Bevin

9. 103/43/48

To Sir John Balfour

d. 8.40 p.m., 26th May, 1948

r. 4.08 p.m., 26th May, 1948.

SECRETARY
GENERAL REG.

SECRET.

Following received from Amman telegram No. 399 of 26th May repeated for information to United Kingdom delegation, New York, Washington, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, B.M.F.O., and Jerusalem.

Begins.

Palestine Truce.

Your telegram No. 433.

After my talk with the Regent yesterday he asked the Prime Minister of Transjordan to do all he could to secure acceptance of cease-fire but not to do it in such a manner as to enable other states to accuse Hashimites of having abandoned the fight first. This attitude of mind plus suspicion of other states that Transjordan always intended to halt short of Jewish territory gave rise to principal difficulties encountered in connexion with cease-fire resolution.

2. This morning early the King telephoned me and said apologetically that he had done all he could to get cease fire but that the opposition of Azzam and Egyptian delegate had resulted in a resolution of the political committee of the League which was neither acceptance nor refusal. I tried to contact the Prime Minister and found he was sitting with other delegates producing the final resolution.

3. I sent word that I had received a message from you which he should know of before other delegates left. As they get tired of my personal pressure I asked the First Secretary to take up a note indicating the sense of your message and I also asked him to remind the Prime Minister of our reference to possible adoption by Transjordan alone of a cease-fire.

4. At the interview the Prime Minister said that there was no chance of changing the resolution, the gist of which after a long preamble was as follows: (here insert text of my immediately following telegram). Prime Minister went on to say that it was only after great effort that he had secured so conciliatory a message as Egyptians had wished to refuse to consider the appeal to all. Relatively mild wording of the resolution was out of courtesy to Great Britain whose efforts on behalf of the Arabs were genuinely appreciated.

5. As regards the suggestion that

Transjordan/

Transjordan should alone accept a cease-fire the Prime Minister answered that we must realise that this was impossible for the Transjordan authorities however much they wished to do so and whatever might be the international penalties if they did not. He had already said much the same thing to me in anticipation of such a suggestion. He pointed out that Transjordan was a small part of the Arab world and could not defy Arab opinion to that extent. My own view is that neither King Abdullah nor the Prime Minister could carry the blame which such an action would call upon them in the Arab world. It is not necessary for me to indicate here the obvious accusations which would be made against them. The Prime Minister could never survive the action politically and it might bring down the Hashimites both in Transjordan and in Iraq. I recommend therefore that the proposal should not be pressed. If this necessitates a revision of His Majesty's Government's policy as regards assistance to Transjordan it will be most unfortunate but I feel that it would be a lesser evil.

6. It is with a feeling of personal failure that I report this position but I am convinced that King Abdullah and the Prime Minister of Transjordan did their best to satisfy your wishes. I am not so sure about the Regent.

Foreign Office please pass most immediate to United Kingdom Delegation, New York and Washington and important to Jedda as my telegrams Nos. 71, 36 & 61 respectively.

CHANCERY

Ref. G. 103/28/48

May 25th, 1948

My dear Mr. Henderson,

I left with you yesterday a summary of Mr. Bevin's account of his conversation with the United States Ambassador on Palestine on the 22nd May. This account mentioned a proposal that Mr. Douglas should discuss the wider implications of the Palestine question further with Ministers of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

This meeting took place this morning, and I now enclose a partial account of it which we have just received by telegraph from the Foreign Office. You will see that Mr. Bevin is most anxious that certain further representations should be made to the Jews by the United States Government. No doubt Mr. Douglas will be telegraphing to you on this point.

Yours sincerely,

W. D. Allen

Mr. Loy Henderson,
Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs,
Department of State of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

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The United States Ambassador took part in a meeting this morning attended by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Chiefs of Staff and myself to discuss Palestine.

I told Mr. Douglas that I had already strongly pressed the Arab Governments to accept a cease fire on the terms of the resolution of the Security Council without attaching any conditions. I said that I would make fresh representations in the same sense today. At the same time I felt that the Arabs were entitled to receive an assurance that on the Jewish side the cease fire was accepted and would be observed by the Stern gang and by the Irgun as well as by the Jewish authorities. I would ask the United States Government to take up this point with equal insistence with the Jews. I also urged that the United States Government should press upon the Jews, perhaps through Dr. Weizmann, that the Jews should themselves make a declaration today that there would be no further immigration into Palestine except for women and children during the period of the cease fire.

I have since issued instructions for these fresh representations to the Arab leaders. Mr. Douglas has telegraphed to the State Department urging action as above by the United States Government with the Jews as the contribution of the United States to our common effort to obtain a cease fire.

Mr. Douglas will also be telegraphing to the State Department today the substance of the discussion on the wider strategic and political aspects of the Palestine question.

Palestine: Security Council
3103/27/48

el. No. 5575
of 23rd May 1948

CYPHER OTP

COPIES TO:

Mr. Bromley

Brig. Price (2)

From Foreign Office (Via U. K. Del New York)
To Lord Inverchapel

d. 11.55 a.m. 24th May 1948

r. 9.48 a.m. 24th May 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 755 of 23rd May
Bagdad, Amman, Jedda, Beirut and Damascus
repeated for information to B.M.E.O. Cairo,
Jerusalem, Washington and U. K. Delegation New
York.

Jerusalem telegram No. 83 of May 23rd reporting
that Jews have agreed to cease fire tomorrow
afternoon.

Please represent urgently to Government to
which you are accredited that this makes it all
the more imperative for Arab Governments to
agree immediately to cease fire on their side
in accordance with advice I have already given
them.

M. Bromley
26/5

1376/46/48
NR
FO No 55746
his (white) repeats
11/5
INDEXED

7390:ss

Tel. No. 2443

of May 24th

CYPHER OTP

IMMEDIATE

GREEN NEG

Copy to:

Brigadier Price
Mr. Bromley

From Sir John Balfour

To Foreign Office

Despatched 7.10 p.m., May 24th, 1948.

Palestine: Security Council

4.103/25(4)48

See C'd

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2443 Immediate, repeated to U.K. Delegation New York (Immediate) telegram No. 227, and BMEC Cairo telegram No. 24, Baghdad telegram No. 8, Amman telegram No. 8, Jedda telegram No. 26, Beirut telegram No. 8, Damascus telegram No. 6 and Cairo telegram No. 16.

CONFIDENTIAL.

My telegram No. 2435, paragraph 3 of 24th May; Cease fire for Palestine.

I understand from the State Department that instructions have now been sent to United States Delegation at New York to support Arab request for extension of time limit.

Foreign Office please pass to BMEC, Cairo, Baghdad, Amman, Jedda, Beirut, Damascus and Cairo as my telegrams 24, 8, 8, 26, 8, 6 and 16 respectively.

WDA:ds

INDEXED

Tel. No. 2436
of May 24th
CYPHER OTP

IMMEDIATE

Copy to:

Mr. Bromley
Brigadier Price

RECEIVED
4.96/100
REG. 4.96/200

25/5/48

WDA:ds

INDEXED

Palestine Security Council
4.103/25(x) 48
Sec'd

From Sir John Balfour

To Foreign Office

Despatched 2.15 p.m., May 24th, 1948

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram
No. 2436 (Immediate) of 24th May, repeated
to U.K. Delegation, New York, No. 55 Saving.

SECRET.

Your telegram No. 5553 of 22nd May;
Palestine.

Summary of main points of your conver-
sation with United States Ambassador on the
22nd May was handed to Director of Office of
Near Eastern and African Affairs today. He
expressed appreciation and at once gave copy
to Mr. Marshall so that he might bring your
views to the attention of the President (see
last sentence of my telegram No. 2435).

2. Henderson commented that your views
usefully reinforced recommendation which he
had just submitted to Mr. Marshall that no
further drastic unilateral action should be
taken by the United States Government for the
time being. His own recommendation had been
based primarily upon considerations of the
safety of United States communities in Arab
countries. In this connexion I understand
that United States military authorities are
arranging direct with British military author-
ities for enough United States Air Force
planes to evacuate 326 United States citizens
from Baghdad, Damascus and Aleppo, to stand
by in Cyprus.

Tel. No. 2435
of May 24th 1948

MOST IMMEDIATE

CYPHER (O.T.P.)

Copies to:
Brigadier Price
Mr. Bromley

CHANGERY
MAY 25 1948

emn.

From Sir John Balfour
To Foreign Office
Despatched 2.25 PM 24th May 1948

Palestine: Security Council
4.103/25/48
Sec 101

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram no. 5585 and your telegram no. 2244 to United Kingdom Delegation, New York /both of the 24th May/; cease fire for Palestine.

Contents of both your telegrams under reference have been communicated to Director of Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the State Department.

2. Henderson agreed to send a telegram at once to the United States Consulate General at Jerusalem instructing them to seek confirmation that Jewish acceptance of cease fire covers Irgun and Stern gang as well as Haganah.

3. Henderson and Rusk, Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs, who was also informed of contents of your telegram no. 2244 to United Kingdom Delegation at New York, were both disposed to agree that Arab request for short extension of time limit, say not more than a further forty-eight hours, was reasonable and should be granted despite probable Jewish opposition. Henderson immediately submitted a recommendation to this effect to Mr. Marshall, who was on the point of leaving for the White House to discuss the whole Palestine question with the President.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo (Ambassador and British Middle East Office), Bagdad, Amman, Jedda, Beirut, Damascus, as my telegrams nos. 15, 23, 7, 7, 25, 7 and 5 respectively.

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Tel. No. 2431

of 22nd May, 1948.

CYPHER OTP

IMMEDIATE

Plus: Mr. Edwards
Mr. Bromley
Brig. Price

4.96 / 199

4.96 / 199

From Sir John Balfour

To Foreign Office

Despatched 10.50 p.m., 22nd May, 1948.

Addressed to Foreign Office, telegram No. 2431 immediate, repeated to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, telegram No. 221, important.

LIGHT.

SECRET.

Washington telegrams Nos. 2404 and 2405 / of 21st May/.

Palestine.

The development of the situation here, as described in the telegrams under reference and in paras. 2 to 4 below, seems to make eminently desirable a further authoritative statement of H.M.G.'s policy, preferably by yourself or even the Prime Minister, and designed to secure publicity in this country.

2. Washington telegram No. 2405 described the mounting criticism of the British attitude. This criticism is not by any means confined merely to Zionists, but is now being strongly voiced by other influential persons in the Administration, Congress, and the press and wireless. Briefly, this criticism may be summarised as follows:-

(a) We say that we desire a truce, but meanwhile we are affording military aid to the Arabs, and appear to be sabotaging the efforts of the Security Council to secure an end to the fighting.

(b) A serious threat to the peace exists, but we seem to be denying its existence and resorting instead to "quibbling" over the legal technicalities of the Charter.

(c) We are consequently exposing the United Nations to the same contempt as was visited on the League of Nations in the case of Ethiopia.

(d) The only way, it is therefore argued, in which the United Nations can restore its prestige in the Middle East is to issue a cease-fire order and impose sanctions on any nation that refuses to obey.

3. Although/

WDA:WPNE:jo

INDEXED

3. Although, as you have pointed out, one factor influencing the American attitude to the present conflict is the Jewish vote, this is, I am convinced, by no means the only or even, at the present time, the major factor. The views described in para. 2 above are strongly held by many influential persons who are moved not at all by considerations of the Jewish vote, but rather by the human and moral issues which are held here to be involved in the present conflict in Palestine, and in the wider issue of the future of the United Nations. Many of these people feel that the British proposals for a truce stand no more chance of success than previous proposals to this end, and that unless the United Nations now proceeds to exercise its full authority under Chapter Seven of the Charter, its complete ineffectiveness will be finally proven. Some of them even go so far as to say that it would be better for the United Nations to invoke the sanctions provided for under Chapter Seven and then fail in applying them, than to reveal the complete ineffectiveness of the United Nations by not even trying the resort to such measures.

4. Whilst our efforts, and those of British Information Services, to present the British case have had some influence in certain quarters, the fact that the Administration is itself strongly opposed to our policy and is daily inspiring comment in press and wireless in support of its policy, has hitherto made it almost impossible for us to secure any wide sympathy or understanding for our point of view.

5. It is against this background ~~that~~, subject to the views of Sir Alexander Cadogan, I would ask you urgently to consider the earliest possible issue of a public statement by H.M.G. The purpose of such a statement would be to set forth, in the plainest and most direct language, the true facts of our position, to emphasise the human, moral and practical considerations which have determined our policy, and to explain that the difference between ourselves and the U.S. Government is one of method, not of the objective to be achieved. Only the briefest reference, if any, should be made to the juridical considerations involved. To secure a sympathetic hearing in this country and make it more difficult for Zionist propaganda to cloud the issue, as it has in the past, I would suggest that the statement should avoid any remarks which could be misconstrued as attacks upon either the Administration or American Jews.

6. The following points, inter alia, might be made.

(a) It is not true that Britain is trying to sabotage the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of the fighting. The real question before the United Nations is not whether attempts should be made to secure a truce - everybody is agreed on that - but how to secure an effective truce which will be just to both parties, and therefore likely to be observed and to lead to a lasting settlement. Indeed, a truce cannot be

effective/

effective unless it is just.

(b) H.M.G. have grave doubts whether it is proper or just at this stage to use for this purpose Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter, which foreshadows forcible action against an aggressor. In deciding who is an aggressor, the United Nations is required to take in effect a judicial decision and must therefore be sure that it has ascertained all the facts before condemning one side or the other. Nothing could more permanently damage the moral standing of the United Nations than to take a hasty and ill-founded decision, from which could possibly follow such drastic measures as those envisaged in Chapter Seven.

(c) For these reasons, H.M.G. have suggested that the United Nations should first proceed on the lines of the resolution submitted by Sir Alexander Cadogan.

(d) Britain, having relinquished the Mandate, seeks no special advantage for herself but merely to play her part impartially, as a member of the Security Council, in securing a settlement. The facts of our treaty relationship with, and the limited extent of our assistance to, the Arab States might then be briefly but simply set forth.

(e) Finally, in so far as general considerations permit, an appeal might be made to all concerned not to ignore the wider objectives of peace, stability, and economic and social progress in the Middle East as a whole, which are as vital to America as they are to ourselves.

7. If you feel able to accept this recommendation, it would be most helpful if text of statement could be telegraphed to me in time for simultaneous release here.

Tel. No. 5585

CYPHER OTP

MOST IMMEDIATE

COPY: BRIG. PRICE
MR. BROMLEY

*Discussed with
Mrs. Lay Henderson
together with later
telegram*

Draft tel.

*Hall 24/5
J.B.
24/5*

NO: 7372:A

INDEXED

Palestine: Security Council

From MR. BEVIN

To SIR JOHN BALFOUR

G. 103/257(a)/48

d. 1:14 p.m. 24th May, 1948

r. 8:24 a.m. " " "

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Washington tel no. 5585 of 24th May and U.K. Del. New York, repeated for information to Cairo, Baghdad, Amman, Jedda, Beirut, Damascus and B.M.E.O.

You should inform State Department and U.S. Delegation that I have followed up my general appeal to the Arab Government to agree to a cease fire in Palestine by special personal appeals to King Abdullah, King Farouk and the Regent of Iraq,

2. You should at the same time press the Americans to obtain confirmation from the Jews that their acceptance of cease fire covers the Irgun and Stern gang as well as Haganah. You should recall that previous cease fire arranged by us in Jerusalem was broken by Stern gang. We would be put in an impossible position if after we had used so much pressure on Arab Governments, based largely on Jewish acceptance, it turned out that Jewish authorities could in fact not control their own extremists.

Tel. No. 2432
~~221~~

of May 23rd, 1948

MOST IMMEDIATE

Copies: Mr. Bromley
Brig. Price

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Palestine: Security Council

G. 103/10/48

From Sir John Balfour

To Foreign Office,

Despatched 3.39 May 23rd

Addressed to Foreign Office Telegram
No. 2432 of May 23rd, repeated to United
Kingdom Delegation New York IMMEDIATE, Telegram
No. 221.

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 5569 (of 23rd May)

PALESTINE

Action taken with State Department
this afternoon.

2. They inform us that, according to their
Consulate-General in Jerusalem, Jewish
authorities are about to announce that they
will order a cease-fire on all fronts as of
2000 hours local Jewish time on 24rd May, or
earlier, if Arabs cease fire earlier. If
Arabs continue operations, Jewish defence
forces will also continue.

JB:MB:EmK

INDEXED

G.103/-/48SECRET

Encl. n G 103.

G. 103/5/48PALESTINE

The United Kingdom Representative on the

Security Council has been instructed to comment on the following lines upon the draft United States resolution about the fighting in Palestine which was introduced into the Security Council on the 17th May, and upon the list of questions to be addressed to the Arabs and the Jews which accompanied it.

2. Sir Alexander Cadogan is to say that His Majesty's Government feel that it is most undesirable to bring in Article 39 of the Charter because this inevitably commits the Security Council eventually to action under Chapter VII. It cannot be foreseen where this would lead, and it is probable that no states are prepared for the action which would flow from that Article. Article 39 was not, in fact, used as a basis for standstill action in the cases of Indonesia and Kashmir.

3. It is, moreover, unjust to view the action of the Arab States in isolation. That is the latest of a series of events in Palestine which should be regarded as a whole. Armed action has been taken by both parties, since the Jews, for their part, have taken the offensive at Jaffa and at Deir Yassin, have broken the cease fire in Jerusalem and are now reported to have attacked Acre and to have entered the Lebanon. There is at present a lack of impartial information from Palestine which would enable the Security Council to consider the situation there as a whole.

4. The juridical position, too, is very far from clear. The Assembly recommendations of the 29th November did not effectively set up any state or states in

Palestine /

Handed by me to
Mr. Merriam, Chief
of IV. E. Div.

S.D. who said
that he would
submit it to
higher authority
at once.

R. M. Bowley
15/5

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7

Palestine. ^{They} It empowered a United Nations Commission to take certain action, and the Commission later reported to the Security Council that it was unable to take such action unless it was provided with the means of enforcement. In His Majesty's Government's view, therefore, the whole legal position requires clarification before further United Nations action is taken, and it is desirable that time for mediation should be given before drastic action is taken.

5. Sir Alexander Cadogan is then to say that, while he cannot in these circumstances agree to anything based upon Article 39 of the Charter, he would not oppose a resolution which

- (A) Sought further information about the situation in Palestine
- (B) Proposed an examination of the juridical position
- (C) Called upon the Assembly Committee to appoint a mediator with the utmost speed and called on all parties concerned to give him the utmost assistance when appointed
- (D) Called upon all parties concerned in Palestine to abstain from acts of armed force against each other, and
- (E) Contained some specific reference to Jerusalem on the lines that, given the considerable difficulties in the way of a truce for the whole country, by far the most practical and useful work that the United Nations could undertake would be to bring about a truce in Jerusalem, for which there is a reasonable hope, while the situation in the rest of Palestine was being further considered.

To this His Majesty's Government would give their fullest support.

6. In connexion with point (A) above, Sir Alexander Cadogan is authorised to express agreement with the list of questions suggested by Mr. Austin, subject to the following amendments. His Majesty's Government do not feel that the questions to the Jews should be addressed to "the Provisional Government of Israel", as this would imply Security Council recognition of that Government. They should, in His Majesty's Government's view, be addressed to "the provisional authorities in the areas of Palestine having a Jewish majority", or possibly to "the provisional Jewish authorities in Palestine". Question (B) to the Jews should, His Majesty's Government feel, read as follows: "Do you have armed forces operating in Palestine or outside Palestine?". His Majesty's Government also consider that a further question to the Jews should be added, namely, "Have you arranged for the entry into Palestine in the near future of men of military age from outside Palestine? If so, what are the numbers and where are they coming from?"

7. In conclusion, Sir Alexander Cadogan and this Embassy are respectively instructed to inform the United States Delegation at New York and the State Department of the above instructions and to express the strong hope that the United States Government will feel able to modify its resolution in order to take account of these arguments.

BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

18th May, 1948.

Palestine: Security Council
G. 103/4/48

NO COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE MADE WITHOUT PERMISSION.

CYPHER (O.T.P.)

Telegram No. 5392

of 18th May, 1948,

From: Foreign Office

To : Lord Inverchapel

Desp: 4.05 p.m. 18th May, 1948.

Rocd: 11.17 a.m. 18th May, 1948.

MOST IMMEDIATE

CHANCERY (NO)
DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

GIANT

Chancery - Action
H.E.
Sir J. Balfour
W.D. Allen
F.R. Hoyer Millar

Addressed to U.K. Delegation, New York
telegram No. /?2125/ of 18th May repeated for
information to Washington.

My immediately preceding telegram.

plus

Following are amendments to list of
questions in your telegram No. 1520.

T.E. Bromley
Brig. G.R. Price

2. Last series of questions should not be "to
the Provisional Government of Israel" as this
would imply Security Council recognition of that
government. They should be "to the provisional
authorities in the areas of Palestine having a
Jewish majority" or, if agreement cannot be
obtained on this, "to the provisional Jewish
authorities in Palestine."

3. Question B should read "Do you have armed
forces operating in Palestine or outside Palestine?"

4. A further question should be added: "Have
you arranged for the entry into Palestine in the
near future of men of military age from outside
Palestine? If so, what are the numbers and where
are they coming from?"

5. We would not object to the additional
question proposed by Khoury in paragraph 3 of your
telegram but there does not seem much point in it
as in our view there is no legal reason why the
Jews or anyone else should not claim to set up a
state in Palestine. It is the legal validity of
any such claim which is in question.

INDEXED

*See memorandum given to State
Dept. on the basis of this telegram,
-/3 and G96/140.*

*Th. Bromley
20/5/48*

7061:CNO

SECRET

G. 103/3/48

No copies of this document may be made without permission.

CYPHER (O.T.P.)

From: Foreign Office

Telegram No. 5391

To : Lord Inverchapel

of 18th May, 1948.

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Recd: 11.42 a.m. 18th May, 1948.

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Addressed to U.K. Delegation, New York No.
2124 of May 18th repeated for information Washington

Your telegrams Nos. 1520 and 1521.

I agree with you that we cannot oppose a standstill resolution as such, provided it is properly worded and provided that it is not based on Article 39.

2. Now that we have the American resolution and proposed questions before us, the instructions in my telegram No. 2112 can be somewhat revised so as to meet the specific points which are raised. Your line on the United States Resolution should be as follows:

(1) It is most undesirable to bring in Article 39 of the Charter for the reasons given by you that no-one knows where this would take us and that probably no states are prepared for the action which might flow from the use of this Article. You should also quote the precedents of Kashmir and Indonesia in which the standstill action was not based on this Article. You should also argue that it is most undesirable to come to a conclusion as would be the case if Article 39 was invoked before the Security Council have received the necessary information.

(2) You should then emphasise the fact that armed action has been taken by both parties on the lines of the instructions in my telegram under reference and including a reference to reported Jewish attack inside the Lebanon. You should also call attention to the uncertain juridical position on the lines of my telegram under reference and to the desirability of leaving time for mediation before drastic action is decided.

(3) You should say that in these circumstances while you cannot agree to anything based on Article 39 you would not oppose a resolution which:

(a) Sought further information and in this connexion you could express agreement with the American list of questions subject to amendments in my immediately following telegram;

(b) Proposed an examination of the juridical position (paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference);

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(c) Called on the Assembly Committee to appoint a mediator with the utmost speed and called on all parties concerned to give him the utmost assistance when appointed;

(d) Called upon all parties concerned in Palestine to abstain from acts of armed force against each other;

(e) Contained some specific reference to Jerusalem, as proposed in my telegram under reference.

3. For your own information we would not regard (d) above as preventing the Arab states from occupying further areas of Palestine provided that this action did not bring them into armed conflict with the Jews. We should be strongly opposed to any attempt to draw lines beyond which the forces of either side could not move as this would endorse partition.

4. If a resolution on the above lines was put to the vote, you could vote in favour of it. If contrary to your expectations, there is any chance of a resolution based on Article 39 being approved you should request an adjournment for further instructions making it clear that failing this you will have to exercise the veto.

5. You should inform United States Delegation in advance of the nature of your instructions and urge them strongly to modify their resolution accordingly. His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington should take similar action with State Department.

You should also keep Canadian, French and other friendly delegations closely informed.